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NOTES
The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehensive Guide for the
Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts
The question of whether a plaintiff in an automobile personal injury ac-
tion should be precluded from recovering for the full extent of his injuries
because he failed to use an available seat belt remains an unsettled issue in
automobile litigation.' In its infancy, 2 the so-called "seat belt defense" was
used by defense counsel to establish that plaintiff was negligent per se or con-
tributorily negligent, and hence barred from recovering for his injuries. These
theories, however, were largely rejected by the courts.3 Subsequently, the seat
belt defense was introduced to lower plaintiffs recovery on the theory that he
had failed to mitigate damages. 4 The courts disagreed sharply on the mitiga-
tion theory, and most eventually rejected it. 5
Nevertheless, the seat belt defense has refused to die. It has found its way
1 The so-called "seat belt defense" relieves the negligent defendant in an automobile injury case from
liability for those injuries to the plaintiff which would not have occurred had plaintiffused an available seat
belt. Thus, where a passenger is thrown against the windshield and injured in an accident, he may not
recover for those injuries if the defendant shows by expert testimony that use of a seat belt would have
prevented the passenger from hitting the windshield.
"Seat belt," as referred to in this note, means those safety restraint devices commonly used in
passenger vehicles, including both the "lap" belt and the shoulder harness.
2 The first known application of the seat belt defense occurred in Stockinger v. Dunisch (Sheboygan
County [Wis.] Cir. Ct. 1964), discussed in 5 FoR THE DEFENSE 79 (1964).
3 See Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966); Hansen v. Miller, 93 Idaho 314, 460 P.2d
739 (1969); Williams v. Chrysler Motor Co., 271 So. 2d 551 (La. App. 1972); Kavanaugh v. Butorac, 140
Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966); Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 784 (La. App.
1968); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super.
270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967); Kunze v. Stang, 191 N.W. 2d 526 (N.D. 1971); Smith v. Oregon Agricultural
Trucking Ass'n, 272 Or. 156, 535 P.2d 1371 (1975); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Or. 52, 457 P.2d 483 (1969).
These cases are primary support for those states classified as rejecting seat belt evidence to show con-
tributory negligence in note 10 infra.
4 Cases accepting the seat belt defense when offered to mitigate damages are: Wilson v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc. 445 F. Supp 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978); Benner v. Interstate Container Corp. 73 F.R.D. 502
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Pritts v. Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Truman v. Vargas,
275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969); Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145
(1969); Uresky v. Fedora, 27 Conn. Supp. 498, 245 A.2d 393 (1968); Dudanas v. Plate, 44 111. App 3d 901,
358 N.E. 2d 1171 (1976); Eichorn v. Olson, 32 Ill. App. 3d 587, 335 N.E.2d 774 (1975); Mount v. Mc-
Clellan, 91 111. App. 2d 1, 234 N.E.2d 329 (1968); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363
N.Y.S. 2d 916 (1974); Parise v. Fehnel, __ Pa. Super -, 406 A.2d 345 (1979); Sams v. Sams, 247
S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967). These cases
are primary support for those states classified as admitting seat belt evidence to mitigate damages in note 10
infra.
5 Cases rejecting the seat belt defense when offered to mitigate damages are: Britton v. Doehring, 287
Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521 P.2d 161 (1974); Fischer v.
Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Hotchkiss v. Preble, 33 Colo. App. 431,521 P.2d 1278 (1974);
Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 1976);
Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972); Placek v. Sterling Heights, 52
Mich. App. 619, 217 N.W.2d 900 (1974); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606
(1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., No.
14810 (Sup. Ct. Mont. March 13, 1980); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d
719 (Ct. App. 1975); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App.
2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53, rev'don other grounds 29 Ohio St. 2d 99, 279 N.E.2d 878 (1971); Fields v. Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974); Amend
v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030
(1972). These cases are primary support for those states classified as rejecting the seat belt defense in note 10
infra.
from the traditional automobile collision case, the basis of which lies in
negligence, into the realm of strict products liability. 6 Furthermore, in at least
two cases, an enterprising defendant has attempted to use seat belt evidence of-
fensively to gain indemnification on a theory of imputed negligence.
7
To date, the seat belt defense has been ruled upon by only thirteen of the
highest state courts.8 Five state legislatures have statutorily excluded seat belt
evidence from admission in personal injury actions. 9 There remain, however,
thirty-two states and the District of Columbia whose legislature and highest
6 In product liability actions, seat belt evidence may be offered for several purposes. First, evidence of
the plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt may be offered by the manufacturer to mitigate damages sustained by
the plaintiff. Courts disagree on the question of the availability of the seat belt defense in these actions. See
Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978) (admissible to mitigate
damages); Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (inadmissible); Langford v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 373 F. Supp 1251 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (inadmissible); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (inadmissible); Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal.
3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976) (inadmissible); Breault v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mass. 352,
305 N.E.2d 824 (1973) (leaning toward admissibility if causal connection established); Selmo v. Baratano,
28 Mich. App. 217, 184 N.W.2d 367 (1970) (inadmissible); Fields v. Volkswagen of America Inc., 555 P.2d
48 (Okla. 1976) (inadmissible).
The second context in which seat belt evidence is used pertains to the issue of "product misuse."
Again, there is conflicting authority on this issue. Courts refusing to admit evidence of non-use to establish
product misuse state that because this type of misuse is foreseeable, the defense is unavailable. See Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Horn v. General Motors
Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976).
On the other hand, some courts-refuse to find as a matter of law that non-use is foreseeable. In these
jurisdictions seat belt evidence is admissible and the question of foreseeability is left for the jury to deter-
mine. See Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); General Motors Corp. v. Walden 406
F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1969); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305 (1978).
For a general discussion of the seat belt defense in product liability actions, see Palumbo, Unpublished
Memorandum (May, 1980) (copy on file at The Notre Dame Lawyer office).
7 Latta v. Sielke, 60 A.D.2d 991, 401 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1978). In Latta, the defendant sought indem-
nification from the mother of the plaintiff child claiming that the mother's failure to fasten her daughter's
seat belt required her to indemnify the defendant for those injuries the daughter received due to non-use of
the seat belt. The child through her parents had already sued and recovered from the defendant. The court
found that since a daughter could not directly recover from her mother, no action for indemnity could lie
whereby the child would indirectly, through the defendant, recover from her parent.
In Williams v. Chrysler Motor Company, 271 So. 2d 551 (La. App. 1972), the plaintiff Linda Birch
Williams was a passenger in an auto driven by her husband. The plaintiff was riding in the front seat and a
second guest, Homer M. Waller, was sitting in a rear seat with an unfastened seat belt. When the accident
occurred, the rear passenger, Waller, was thrown forward, hitting the front seat, which collapsed and in-
jured the plaintiff. Mrs. Williams sued Chrysler stating that the defective safety latch on the seat permitted
the seat to collapse when hit by the rear passenger. Chrysler then brought suit against the rear passenger
seeking indemnification for his negligence in failing to wear a seat belt. The Court of Appeals of Louisiana
found that no cause of action was stated under Louisiana law because it was not negligent to fail to use a seat
belt.
8 See Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970) (failure to use seat belt is inadmissible to
mitigate damages); Hansen v. Miller, 93 Idaho 314, 460 P.2d 739 (1969) (inadmissible to prove con-
tributory negligence); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974) (admissi-
ble to mitigate damages); Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972) (inad-
missible to mitigate damages); Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 273 (1967) (inadmissible to
prove contributory negligence); Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., No. 14810 (Sup. Ct. Mont. March
13, 1980) (inadmissible); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968) (inadmissible); Fields v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976) (inadmissible); Smith v. Oregon Agricultural
Trucking Ass'n, 272 Or. 156, 535 P.2d 1371 (1975) (inadmissible to prove contributory negligence); Sams
v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966) (admissible); Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.
1974) (no duty to mitigate damages); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977) (inadmissible);
Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967) (admissible).
9 See IowA CODE ANN. 5 321.445 (West 1966) ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368A (1964); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 169.685(4) (West Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 55-9-214 (1980); VA. CODE 5
46.1-309.1(b) (1980).
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courts have yet to settle the question of the seat belt defense. 10 Thus, despite
10 The status of the seat belt defense can be summarized as follows:
DEFINITIVE HOLDINGS By A COURT CONSTRUING STATE LAW*
Inadmissible Inadmissible Admissible No Opinion
on Contributory to Mitigate
Negligence
Florida ALABAMA California Alaska
IDAHO Arizona Connecticuta Arkansas
Indianab Colorado Illinois Georgia
Louisiana Delaware MissisSI Hawaii
MARYLAN~d Dist. Columbia NEW YORK Kentucky
New Jerseyf  KANSAS Pennsylvaniah Massachusetts
North Dakota Michigan SOUTH CAROLINA Nebraska
OREGON g  Missouri WISCONSIN Nevada
MONTANA New Hampshire
New Mexico Rhode Island
NORTH CAROLINA South Dakota
Ohio Utah
OKLAHOMA Vermont
TEXAS West Virginia
WASHINGTON Wyoming
Iowa**
Maine*
Minnesota-
Tennessee-*
Virginia" *
8 states 20 states 8 states 15 states
• Capital letters indicate that the seat belt defense has been ruled upon by the highest state court.
Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Tennessee and Virginia have enacted legislation which prohibits the introduc-
tion of the seat belt defense.
a In Connecticut, Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969) is commonly cited as
favoring the introduction of the seat belt defense on the issue of damages. However, more recent decisions in
Connecticut suggest that the seat belt defense may not be available. See Melesko v. Riley, 32 Conn. Supp.
89, 339 A.2d 499 (1975); Brown v. Case, 31 Conn. Supp. 207, 327 A.2d 267 (1974); Cf. DeLott v.
Roraback, 41 CLJ 27 (Sup. Ct. Conn. Jan. 1, 1980) (suggestion by court that seat belt defense is not settled
in Connecticut).
b Indiana law was stated in Kavanaugh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966), which is
commonly cited as implicitly adopting the seat belt defense to mitigate damages. The court's holding in
Kavanaugh is not that broad. More recent Indiana decisions suggest that the question of mitigation remains
unsettled. See Rhinebarger v. Mummert, __ Ind. App. -, 362 N.E.2d. 184 (1977); Gibson v.
Henninger, 170 Ind. App. 55, 350 N.E.2d 631 (1976); Birdsong v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 160
Ind. App. 411, 312 N.E.2d 104 (1974); Cf. Mays v. Dealer Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971)
(permitting jury to consider plaintiff's non-use).
c In Becnel v. Ward, 286 So. 2d 731 (La. App. 1973), the court appeared to favor the admission of seat belt
evidence to mitigate damages where defendant causally connected the non-use with the aggravation of in-
juries.
d In Cierpisz v. Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 273 (1967), the Supreme Court of Maryland strongly in-
timated that it would, if faced with the issue in the future, favor the admission ofseat belt evidence on the
question of damages.
e The only definitive rulings by courts construing Mississippi law have been in the federal courts. In Glover
v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Miss. 1970) the court found that seat belt evidence was admissible to
mitigate damages but prohibited its admission in the case where no causal connection between the injury
and non-use was shown. Cf. Peterson v. Klos, 426 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (taking a less favorable view
toward admissibility). In D. W. Boutwell Butane Co. v. Smith, 244 So. 2d 11 (1974), the Supreme Court of
Mississippi found insufficient evidence to sustain a jury instruction on the seat belt defense. The court's
decision, however, did not specifically address the admissibility of the seat belt defense.
f In Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967), the New Jersey Superior Court
found seat belt evidence inadmissible though the opinion generally favored its admission. New Jersey law
remains unsettled on this issue. See Polyard v. Terry, 148 N.J. Super. 202, 372 A.2d 378 (1977).
g In Smith v. Oregon Agricultural Trucking Ass'n, 272 Or. 156, 535 P.2d 1371 (1975), the Oregon
Supreme Court strongly suggested that the seat belt defense was inadmissible on the question of damages.
h In Pritts v. Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975), the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania construed Pennsylvania law to permit seat belt evidence on the
issue ofdamages. See also Benner v. Interstate Container Corp., 73 F.R.D. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (construing
Pennsylvania law). In Parise v. Fehnel, __ Pa. Super. -, 406 A.2d 345 (1970), the superior court
[December 19801
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the abundance of literature on the defense, most of which was written in the
decade following its origin,1 a thorough investigation and analysis of the
defense appears warranted in light of further developments in case law and
legislation.
This note is divided into three parts. Part one examines the various
theories used to introduce seat belt evidence, including two "hybrid" theories
heretofore unexamined. Part two summarizes the arguments favoring and op-
posing the admission of seat belt evidence. This section attempts to "do the
research" for the lawyer and suggest those arguments which a court, sitting in
a case of first impression, is likely to find persuasive. Part three critically
analyzes the seat belt defense and concludes that seat belt evidence should be
inadmissible except in extraordinary cases.
I. Theories Supporting the Introduction of Evidence
of Non-Use of a Seat Belt
A. The Mitigation Theory
Under the mitigation theory, evidence of the plaintiffs failure to use a seat
belt is directed toward the issue of damages rather than the issue of liability.
This appears to be the most appropriate use of such evidence and is the theory
which most courts admitting seat belt evidence have favored. 12 Proponents of
the mitigation theory argue that, since a defendant is liable only for those
damages which he proximately caused, he should not be responsible for in-
juries resulting from the plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt.
Defense counsel advancing the mitigation theory have employed several
different approaches. Under one approach the defendant pleaded that the
plaintiff, in failing to fasten his seat belt, violated his duty to exercise ordinary
care for himself and was therefore contributorily negligent. Defendant further
pleaded that plaintiffs negligence totally barred him from recovery or, in the
alternative, barred him from recovering for those injuries attributable to non-
use of the seat belt. 13 As courts uniformly rejected the argument that failure to
use a seat belt totally barred recovery, 14 the defendant was limited to pleading
contributory negligence for purposes of reducing damages.
A second approach used to introduce seat belt evidence is premised upon
suggested that the seat belt defense was admissible if a causal connection between non-use and the injury
was established.
11 Particularly useful articles include: Bowman, Practical Defense Problems in the Trial Lawyer's View, 53
MARQ. L. REV. 191 (1970); Hogland & Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative
Negligence Law, 50 WASH L. REV. 1 (1975); Huelke, Practical Defense Problems - The Expert's View, 53 MARQ. L.
REV. 203 (1970); Kircher, The Safety Belt Defense- State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 172 (1970); Kleist, The
Seat Belt Defense - An Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTINGS L. J. 613 (1967); Miller, The Seat Belt Defense Under Com-
parative Negligence, 12 IDAHO L. REV. 59 (1975); Roethe, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis.
L. REV 288; Snyder, The Seat Belt As a Cause of Injury, 53 MARQ. L. REV 211 (1970), Walker and Beck, Seat
Belts and the Second Accident, 34 INs. CouNsELJ. 349 (1967).
12 See note 4 supra and cases cited therein.
13 See discussion in Kircher, The Safety Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REV 172, 173 (1970).
14 See note 3 supra and cases cited therein.
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the doctrine of avoidable consequences. t5 Although this doctrine usually ap-
plies only to post-accident conduct, Dean Prosser suggests that it is nothing
more than a rule of damages applicable whenever damages can be accurately
apportioned to their respective causes. 16 Thus a plaintiff is barred from
recovering for those injuries which he could have avoided by wearing a seat
belt.
A third approach used to introduce seat belt evidence is based upon the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. Comment c to section 465 of the Restatement
(Second) dealing with the causal relation between the harm and plaintiff's
negligence, states that damages may be apportioned
where the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff is found not to contribute in
any way to the original accident or injury, but to be asubstantial contributing
factor in increasing the harm which ensues. There must of course be satisfac-
tory evidence to support such a finding, and the court may properly refuse to
permit the apportionment on the basis of mere speculation.1 7
A fourth approach used to introduce seat belt evidence to mitigate
damages is available in those states which have adopted the doctrine of com-
parative negligence.1 8 Since comparative negligence is geared toward appor-
tioning damages between parties according to fault, 19 seat belt evidence aids
the jury in determining the degree of fault of the respective parties. Several
courts, both favoring and opposing the seat belt defense, suggest that admis-
sion of seat belt evidence constitutes an implicit adoption of comparative
negligence. 20
15 The doctrine of avoidable consequences is a rule of damages which denies a plaintiflfrecovery for any
damages which can be avoided by reasonable conduct. The rule traditionally applies to a situation where a
legal wrong has occurred, but some damages attributable to that wrong can still be avoided. For cases which
have admitted seat belt evidence under this approach, see Pritts v. Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (applying Pennsylvania law); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d. 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974); Kavanaugh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966).
16 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 422-24 (4th ed. 1971); See also McCoRmticK, DAMAGES, ch.
5, § 33, at 127-30 (1935).
17 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 465, comment c (1965).
18 Comparative negligence has been adopted in one form or another in thirty-four states. Placek v.
Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 653, 275 N.W.2d 511, 515 (1979) (judicially adopting comparative
negligence in Michigan). These states include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Id.
19 See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971).
20 Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (opposing); Britton v. Doehring, 286
Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970) (opposing); Miller v. Haynes 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970) (opposing);
Barry v. Coca-Cola 99 N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967) (generally favoring); Derheim v. N. Fiorito
Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1080 (1972) (opposing); Hernke v. Coronet Ins. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 170, 240
N.W.2d 382 (1976) (favoring); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967) (favoring). But
see Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
In Amend, the Supreme Court of Washington examined the effect of the adoption of comparative
negligence principles on prior Washington decisions involving the seat belt defense. Prior to Amend v. Bell,
seat belt evidence was inadmissible to establish contributory negligence or to mitigate damages. Derheim v.
N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1970).
The defendant in Amend argued that under the doctrine of comparative negligence, evidence of the
plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt was admissible on the question of damages. The court, however,
disagreed stating:
[December 1980]
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State courts following a "hybrid" comparative negligence rule2' must
determine whether the jury may consider seat belt evidence in apportioning
fault, or whether it may consider such evidence solely to reduce or mitigate
plaintiff's damages. The following example makes clear the need for the
distinction. Georgia's comparative negligence statute22 provides that a plaintiff
may recover for damages attributable to the defendant's negligence as long as
the plaintiffs negligence does not exceed the defendant's. Georgia's courts
could interpret this statute in either of two ways: (1) as allowing the jury to
compare plaintiffs fault for his injury with defendant's fault for the accident,
or (2) as allowing the jury to determine the defendant's liability for injury to the
plaintiff, and reducing those damages by the percentage of injury attributable
to plaintiff's non-use. Under the first interpretation, if a jury found that the
defendant was seventy percent at fault for the accident, and that the plaintiffs
non-use of the seat belt was responsible for seventy-five percent of his injuries,
the plaintiff could be barred from any recovery. In this case, the plaintiffs
seventy-five percent fault for the injury exceeds defendant's seventy percent
fault for the accident, and according to the "hybrid" rule, the plaintiff could
not recover. Under the second interpretation, if seat belt evidence was
restricted to mitigating plaintiffs damages, plaintiff would be entitled to
recover twenty-five percent of the damages attributable to defendant's
negligence. Assuming plaintiffs injuries amount to $100,000, the defendant,
because he is seventy percent at fault for the accident is liable for $70,000.
However, this amount is reduced by seventy-five percent, the percentage of in-
jury attributable to plaintiffs non-use of his seat belt or $52,500. Therefore,
plaintiff recovers $17,500.23
B. Negligence Per Se
A second theory is available to defendants who seek to admit seat belt
evidence to establish that the plaintiff was negligent per se. This defense arises
in those few instances where a statute expressly requires the plaintiff to wear his
seat belt. Some states, for example, require the use of seat belts by the driver
While the result of contributory negligence and comparative negligence is much different, both
are premised upon negligence. In the one case we bar recovery, in the other we compare
negligence and potentially reduce damages. However, in either case, we look to the negligence of
the plaintiff.
The defendant should not diminish the consequences of his negligence by the failure of the
plaintiff to anticipate the defendant's negligence in causing the accident itself. Only if plaintiff
should have so anticipated the accident can it be said that plaintiff had a duty to fasten the seat
belt prior to the accident.
89 Wash. 2d at -, 570 P.2d at 143.
21 As used in this context, the "hybrid" rule is to be distinguished from "pure" comparative
negligence. The hybrid rule permits the plaintiff to recover some damages as long as his negligence does not
exceed the defendant's. Once plaintiffs negligence exceeds the defendant's, he is totally barred from
recovery even though defendant may still be partially negligent in harming the plaintiff. The "hybrid" rule
has been the most popular among those states that have legislatively adopted comparative negligence. See
Kirby v. Larsen, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977) for extensive discussion of comparative negligence
in the United States.
22 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968). For a complete discussion of the Georgia comparative negligence
rules, see AM. JUR. 2D, NEW Topic SERVICE, Comparative Negligence 5 13 (1977).
23 A similar three step analysis in calculating plaintiff's recoverable damages is suggested by Hogland
and Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative Negligence Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 1
(1975).
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and passengers in school buses, emergency vehicles, and other designated
vehicles. 24 Where a plaintiff violates such a statute and his failure to use a seat
belt substantially aggravates his injury, he may be found to be negligent per se.
On the other hand, statutes requiring the installation of seat belts in new
vehicles are uniformly held insufficient to support a finding of negligence per
se, 25 on the ground that such statutes are directed toward the manufacturer
rather than the occupant-user of the belt.
C. New Theories
Seat belt evidence has been held admissible in certain limited situations
under two "hybrid" theories. These theories represent a compromise between
the "polar" theories, under which the courts have either permitted or absolute-
ly refused the admission of seat belt evidence.
The first theory might well be termed the "exceptional circumstances"
theory. As its name implies, evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt is
admissible where exceptional circumstances suggest that the plaintiff should
have exercised extraordinary care by wearing a seat belt. This theory was first
alluded to in Miller v. Miller, 26 a case often cited for its rejection of the seat belt
defense. In Miller, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
Conceivably a situation could arise in which a plaintiffs failure to have his
seat belt buckled at the time he was injured would constitute negligence. It
would, however, have to be a situation in which the plaintiff, with prior
24 Statutes which affirmatively require a person to use a seat belt include: ALA. CODE § 16-27-6 (1975)
(school bus drivers must wear a seat belt while transporting school children); CAL. VEH. CODE 5 27304
(West 1971) (driver and passengers in driver's training vehicle must wear seat belts); CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 27305 (West 1971) (firefighting vehicles must be equipped with a seat belt for each passenger for use); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 95 Y2, § 12807 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) (school bus driver must wear a seat belt); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 2014 (1964) (operator and passengers in school bus must wear seat belts while in mo-
tion); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, 5 7B (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980) (school bus driver must wear a seat belt);
MINN. STAT. ANN § 169.44 (West 1980) (school bus driver must wear a seat belt); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 383 (4-a) (McKinney 1970) (school bus driver must wear a seat belt); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, S 24-121
(West 1972) (school bus driver must wear a seat belt); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-23-41 (1968) (operators of buses
and authorized emergency vehicles must use a seat belt); VA. CODE § 46.1-287.2 (1980) (school bus driver
must wear a seat belt).
25 In a number of early cases, it was argued that statutes requiring the installation of seat belts into
passenger vehicles created a statutory duty for automobile occupants to wear seat belts. Typically these
statutes stated that for every seating position available, there should be installed a seat belt "for use." The
courts, however, uniformly rejected this argument. See note 3 supra.
Those state statutes which require either the installation of seat belts or which prescribe safety stan-
dards applicable to seat belts include: ALA. CODE § 32-5-217 (1975) (requires installation "for use"); ARK.
STAT. ANN § 75-733 (1979); CAL. VEH. CODE § 27302 (West 1971) ("for use"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN
5 14-100a (1958) ("for use"); GA. CODE ANN. S 68-1801 (1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 286-83 (1976); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 9 5 Y2, § 12-603 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.445 (1966); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-1749 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 189.125 (1969); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1368A (1964); MD.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. 5 22-412 (1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); MicH.
CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 257.710a (19.77); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 169.685 (West Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 63-7-63 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.165 (Vernon 1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 5 61-9-409 (1979)
("for use"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-6,171 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.641 (1979) ("for use"); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:3-76.2 (West 1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-874 (1978) ("for use"); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW
§ 383 (1) (McKinney 1970) ("for use"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.1 (1978) ("for use"); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-21-41.1 (1980) ("for use"); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.26.2 (Page 1973) ("for use"); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 12-413 (West Supp. 1979) ("for use"); OR. REV. STAT. S 483.482 (1979) ("for use"); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 31-23-39 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-9-214 (1980) ("for use"); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art.
6701d, § 139E (Vernon 1977); VA. CODE § 46.1-309.1(a) (1980); WASH REV. CODE ANN. 5 46.37.510
(Supp. 1980) ("for use"); W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-43 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347.48 (West 1971) ("for
use").
26 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
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knowledge of a specific hazard-one not generally associated with highway
travel and one from which a seat belt would have protected him-had failed or
refused to fasten his seat belt.
27
The court hypothesized that such a situation might arise where "the
defendant-driver tells the plaintiff-passenger to buckle his seat belt because the
door on his side has a defective lock and might come open at any time." '28
The "exceptional circumstances" theory was expanded in Remington v.
Arndt 2 9 where the Connecticut Superior Court stated:
[A]fter ajourney has begun, circumstances may arise theoretically where due
care will require a passenger to anticipate an accident and to take appropriate
action if he has the opportunity to do so. Suppose, for example, the operator
should warn the passenger, during the course of the journey, to fasten his seat
belt because the brakes or the steering mechanism had suddenly become
unreliable. In a case such as that, the same principle which might bar the ac-
tion in cases where the passenger's trauma is directly related to the failure to
fasten the seat belt would be applicable in mitigation of the plaintiff's
damages.3 0
It appeared for a time as if the Connecticut courts had adopted the "excep-
tional circumstances" theory, but a recent decision has cast considerable doubt
on such a conclusion. 3 1
Nevertheless, the "exceptional circumstances" theory appears to be
available at least to drivers who are sued by their passengers. The Miller court
suggested that the theory should also be available to drivers sued by passengers
in other vehicles. 32 Indeed, there is no reason why the theory should not be ex-
tended to embrace other "exceptional circumstances," such as where the
passenger is aware that the driver of the car in which he is riding is not totally
reliable.3 3
At least one court has suggested a second "hybrid" theory, which
distinguishes between the admissibility of seat belt evidence in non-fatal colli-
sions and its admissibility in "wrongful death" actions. In Noth v. Scheurer,34
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, constru-
ing New York law, stated:
In accident cases involving the failure to wear seat belts, there is a distinc-
tion to be made between causes of actions for injuries and causes of actions for
wrongful death. The utilization of the seat belt in the latter case conceivably
might have prevented the extreme result of death and the cause of action aris-
ing therefrom, whereas in the former case its use would only have reduced the
27 Id. at -, 160 S.E.2d at 70.
28 Id.
29 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969).
30 Id. at 292, 259 A.2d at 146.
31 See Melesko v. Riley, 32 Conn. Supp. 89, 339 A.2d 479 (1975) (holding the seat belt defense
unavailable to show contributory negligence). See also note 10 supra.
32 273 N.C. at , 160 S.E.2d at 70.
33 For example, exceptional circumstances arguably arise where the passenger is aware that the defen-
dant/driver has been drinking or is tired or for some reason is driving too fast. See the discussion in section
III of this note, infra, which suggests a method of applying the "exceptional circumstances" theory.
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extent and degree of the injuries. This is a highly speculative question which if
considered, would be a question for the jury, imposing a heavy burden of
proof upon the defendant.3 5
The Noth decision would permit defendants in wrongful death actions to in-
troduce expert testimony uncategorically showing that use of seat belts would
have prevented the death. A defendant meeting this burden would defeat a
plaintiff's cause of action for wrongful death.
In summary, there are several avenues available to a defendant seeking to
introduce seat belt evidence. First, the defense is sometimes available to
mitigate damages for plaintiff's injuries which were aggravated by his non-use
of a seat belt. This defense can be shaped in terms of contributory negligence,
avoidable consequences, the Restatement (Second) section 465 defense, or
comparative negligence. Second, a statute may permit the defendant to argue
negligence per se. Finally, it may be possible to argue that "exceptional cir-
cumstances" placed the plaintiff on notice of an impending risk, or that the
wrongful death sued upon was caused by the decedent's failure to use a seat
belt rather than by the defendant's negligence.
II. Arguments Favoring and Opposing
the Seat Belt Defense
A. Arguments in Favor of the Seat Belt Defense
The availability of arguments supporting the seat belt defense depends to
some degree on the theory used to introduce the defense. Nonetheless, the
following arguments support, at least to some extent, all of the theories dis-
cussed above.
1. Plaintiffs Duty of Care
Perhaps the most compelling argument available to the defendant is
premised upon the plaintiff's duty to exercise ordinary care to protect himself
from harm. Arguably, an automobile occupant's duty to exercise such care re-
quires him to wear a seat belt so as to avoid or mitigate injury to himself.36
34 285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
35 Id. at 85. Other cases which intimate that a distinction may be proper in the application of the seat
belt defense to death actions as opposed to personal injury actions include: Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72
F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Coker v. Ryder Truck Lines, 287 Ala. 150, 249 So. 2d 810 (1971), Uresky v.
Fedora, 27 Conn. Supp. 498, 245 A.2d 393 (1968).
In Vizzini, a products liability action, the court noted:
Permitting a seat belt defense in mitigation of damages in a death case would lead to other pro-
cedural problems. The Wrongful Death and Survival Acts are premised on a person actually dy-
ing. Allowing a seat belt defense might prevent the plaintiff from recovering certain elements of
damages, such as funeral expenses, even though such damages clearly were sustained.
I. IT]his is an especially inappropriate case for such a defense, because it is a death case
based on products liability.
72 F.R.D. at 138, 139.
36 Truman v. Vargas, 285 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969); Mount v. McLellan, 91 Ill.
App. 2d 1, 234 N.E.2d 329 (1968); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916
(1974); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149
N.W.2d 626 (1967).
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The standard of care which one must exercise is that which the ordinary
and reasonably prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances. 37
The question is primarily one of reasonableness, and a defendant can make a
persuasive argument that plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt was unreasonable.
Statistics overwhelmingly support this argument. For example, the National
Safety Council asserts that the use of seat belts would reduce serious injuries
arising from automobile accidents by thirty-three percent,3 8 and could save up
to twelve thousand lives annually.3 9 Although it is often stated in rebuttal that
most drivers and passengers do not use seat belts, 40 this argument is not per-
suasive. The fact that a majority of people act in a certain manner does not
make such action reasonable. The standard of care which one must exercise is
not necessarily exemplified by the action of the majority, particularly when the
majority's actions involve unnecessary risks. 41 Interestingly, the percentage of
individuals neglecting seat belts has decreased in recent years, an indication
that the public is gradually recognizing the utility of seat belts. 42
Furthermore, it does not appear that a valid reason for non-use of seat
belts exists. Although the likelihood of an accident is relatively small,43 the op-
portunity for serious injury arising from an accident is too great to justify non-
use of seat belts by one who merely dislikes the restraint. It is unlikely that seat
belt use will actually increase injuries. For example, the probability that a car
involved in an accident will catch fire or be submerged is less than one
percent. 4 Medical studies show that seat belt use is more advantageous than
non-use. 45 The argument exonerating non-use is thus unpersuasive.
Defense counsel use two approaches to introduce seat belt evidence on the
issue of due care. The first, and more successful, approach is to offer seat belt
evidence on the general issue of plaintiff's duty to exercise ordinary care. 46 Seat
belt evidence seems sufficiently relevant on this issue to be considered by the
jury. A second approach, successfully employed in Bentzler v. Braun,47 is to
argue that plaintiff has a common law duty to wear a seat belt. This approach
has not been favored, even by those jurisdictions admitting seat belt evidence.
Nonetheless, defense counsel may find it worthwhile, and in some instances
necessary, to resort to this approach.
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
38 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 49 (1963). One research group contends that if all
automobile occupants wore lap and shoulder belts, moderate and severe injuries would be reduced 57.4%.
HIGHWAY SAFETY RESEARCH CENTER, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SEAT BELT EFFECTIVENESS IN 1973-75
MODEL CARS INVOLVED IN TOWAWAY CRASHES (Univ. of N.C. Nov., 1975).
39 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 52 (1975).
40 McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 1976); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968);
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 510 P.2d 138 (1977); NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 53
(1967).
41 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 78 (1971); 65 CJ.S. Negligence S 16 (1966).
42 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Seat Belt Accidents § 3 (Supp. 1980).
43 See discussion in 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Seat Belt Accidents 5 5 (1965). See also NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TANSP., HIGHWAY SAFETY 1978 1-4 (1979)
(fatality rate per 100 million vehicle miles equals 3.27).
44 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Seat Belt Accidents § 5 (1965).
45 See Snyder, The Seat Belt as a Cause of Injury, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 211 (1970) and numerous studies cited
therein.
46 Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969); Mount v. McLellan, 91 111.
App. 2d 1, 234 N.E.2d 329 (1968); Spier v. Baker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916
(1974); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
47 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
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2. Non-Use as Proximate Cause of Injury
A second argument supporting the admission of evidence of plaintiffs
non-use of a seat belt focuses upon causation. A negligent party may be liable
either when (1) his negligence is the proximate cause of the accident or other
event from which the injury resulted; or (2) his.negligence is the direct and
proximate cause of the injuries. While a plaintiff can rarely avoid a collision by
using his seat belt, such use would ordinarily prevent or lessen the plaintiffs
injury. The defendant can therefore argue that the plaintiff proximately caused
and may not recover for that portion of his injuries which a seat belt would
have prevented.
The principle that a tortfeasor is responsible only for that which he prox-
imately causes and not for that which the plaintiff could reasonably have avoid-
ed favors the admissibility of seat belt evidence. To incorporate this principle
into a seat belt defense, the tortfeasor must introduce expert testimony
establishing a causal connection between non-use of the seat belt and the ag-
gravation of injuries. 48
In Glover v. Daniels, 49 the United States district court addressed the issue of
seat belt non-use from the perspective of proximate causation. "As a begin-
ning," the court stated, "it is proper to note the definition of 'proximate cause'
as adopted by the [Mississippi Supreme] Court.' '50 The court found that under
Mississippi law proximate causation related to the injury rather than the event,
and that a jury instruction on the seat belt defense was permissible where
substantial evidence showed that the plaintiffs failure to fasten the seat belt
was causally connected to his injuries.-" Because the court found that the defen-
dant failed to establish a causal connection, it did not have to determine if the
seat belt instruction correctly stated the law of Mississippi.5 2 Nevertheless, the
approach taken by the court in Glover is available to a defendant attempting to
assert the seat belt defense. Where failure to use a seat belt aggravates
plaintiff's injuries, defendant is not liable for those injuries which are the prox-
imate result of plaintiffs non-use.
48 There are two basic requirements to laying a foundation for the seat belt defense. First, it must be
established that the seat belt was "available" for the plaintiff to use. The exact meaning of this requirement
has not been addressed. Clearly, the defense is not available where the automobile has no seat belts in-
stalled. When, however, seat belts are fastened behind the seat or tucked in back of the seat, it is unclear if
this would constitute a situation in which seat belts were "unavailable." See also discussion in Spier v.
Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 449 n.2, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920 (1974).
The second and most important requirement to laying a foundation for the seat belt defense is the
establishment of a causal connection between the failure of the plaintiff to use a seat belt and the increase or
aggravation in injuries received. This requirement can be met by offering expert testimony to establish that
the plaintiff's injuries either would not have occurred or would have been less extensive had plaintiff used a
seat belt. It has been suggested that to establish a prima facie case that the failure to use a seat belt caused all
or a definable portion of plaintiffs injuries, the following should be considered: (I) the particular crash
behavior of the subject vehicle, (2) the trajectory of the claimant's body in the accident; (3) the relationship
of the vehicle crash events to occupant kinematics; (4) the particular injuries suffered; (5) the trajectory
which a restrained occupant would have taken; and (6) the extent of lesser injuries which the restrained oc-
cupant would have sustained as a result of the impacts he would have made with the vehicle. Bowman, Prac-
tical Defense Problems-The Trial Lawyer's View, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 197-202 (1970).
49 310 F. Supp. 750 (N.D. Miss. 1970).
50 Id. at 760.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 761.
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3. Maximum Safety at Minimal Inconvenience
A third argument for the admission of seat belt evidence finds support in
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of New York in Spier v. Barker.53 Accord-
ing to this argument, the unusual opportunity for an automobile occupant to
maximize his safety by wearing a seat belt requires a court to consider seat belt
evidence in a special light. Neither the doctrine of avoidable consequences nor
the rule requiring mitigation of damages ordinarily applies until after the acci-
dent or event attributable to the defendant's negligence has occurred.5 4 Seat
belts provide plaintiffs with such an exceptional opportunity to maximize their
safety prior to an accident at such minimal inconvenience, however, that these
doctrines may justly be applied to pre-accident conduct whose causal connec-
tion to the injury can be readily shown. 55 As the court in Spier stated:
We concede that the opportunity to mitigate damages prior to the occurrence
of an accident does not ordinarily arise, and that the chronological distinction,
on which the concept of mitigation of damages rests, is justified in most cases.
However, in our opinion, the seat belt affords the automobile occupant an
unusual and ordinarily unavailable means by which he or she may minimize
his or her damages prior to the accident. 56
Because plaintiff had this unusual opportunity, the Spier court permitted
the jury to consider evidence of plaintiffs non-use of an available seat belt in
determining whether plaintiff exercised due care to avoid or mitigate injury to
himself 57
4. Miscellaneous Support
Two other arguments in addition to those discussed above support the seat
belt defense. The first of these is the public policy argument. The enactment of
seat belt installation statutes58 by a number of states as well as the federal
government is strong evidence of legislative recognition of the importance of
seat belt use. Although these statutes do not impose a duty upon automobile
occupants to use seat belts, they clearly evidence legislative intent to encourage
such use. Indeed, a number of these statutes expressly state that seat belts be
installed in the driver's seat and every passenger's seat "for use." 59 The exten-
sive media campaigns urging the public to "buckle up for safety" also
undergird the argument that public policy requires automobile occupants to
exercise due care by using seat belts. 60
53 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
54 See notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text.
55 Pritts v. Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Kavanaugh v. Butorac, 140 Ind.
App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916
(1974).
56 Spier v. Baker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 451-52, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974) (em-
phasis in original).
57 Id. at 449-50, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920.
58 See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
59 See note 25 supra. See also Comment, The Failure to Use Seat Belts as a Basis for Establishing Contributory
Negligence, Barring Recovery for Personal Injuries, 1 U.S.F. L. Rev. 277 (1967) (discussion of statutes using
language "equipped with" in contrast to those stating "for use").
60 See Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974);
Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis.2d 362, -, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967).
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A second miscellaneous argument in support of the seat belt defense is
based on general tort theory. The procession of tort law from contributory to
comparative negligence evidences a trend to apportion damages according to
respective faults, and to avoid "all or nothing" judgments. 61 Regardless of the
magnitude of defendant's negligence, a plaintiffs deliberate disregard of
public policy and willingness to risk not using seat belts should not go
unreprimanded. It would be difficult to contend that plaintiff is without some
fault for his injuries. Thus, consideration of seat belt evidence is, according to
general tort theory advocating apportionment of damages, properly within the
jury's province. The seat belt defense would likely result in neither substantial
lost damages to the plaintiff nor a windfall to the defendant, as each juror may
consider the plaintiffs exercise of ordinary care in light of his own experience,
which is typically that of frequent non-use.62
B. Arguments Against the Seat Belt Defense
A number of states have been reluctant to permit the use of seat belt
evidence to mitigate damages. At least twenty jurisdictions have declared,
either judicially or legislatively, that failure to use a seat belt may not be con-
sidered in mitigation of damages. 63 At least eight other states have forbidden
the admission of evidence of the plaintiff's non-use of his seat belt on the issue of
contributory negligence. 64 Thus, more than half of the jurisdictions in the
United States have rejected the seat belt defense in some form. This section
summarizes the arguments against the use of seat belt evidence.
1. Non-Use Merely Furnishes the Condition for Injury
The most obvious argument against the seat belt defense is that the plain-
tiffs failure to use a seat belt does not contribute to the cause of the accident. 65
This argument has been discussed previously in terms of proximate
causation. 66 The plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt merely subjects him to the
risk of receiving more severe injuries. In no way, however, could seat belt use
prevent a tortfeasor from negligently acting so as to place the plaintiff in a posi-
tion of extreme peril. At most, the plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt furnishes
a condition making injury possible. 67 It does not contribute to or cause the acci-
dent.
61 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 433-34 (4th ed. 1970).
62 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 53 (1967).
63 See note 10 supra.
64 Id.
65 Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521 P.2d 161 (1974); Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla.
App. 1966); Hansen v. Miller, 93 Idaho 314, 460 P.2d 739 (1969); Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n,
209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Romankewiz v.
Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970);
Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116
(Tex. 1974); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
66 See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
67 Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., No. 18410 (Sup. Ct. Mont. March 13, 1980); Fields v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976).
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2. The Defendant's Windfall
The logical extension of the previous argument is that if the plaintiff did
not contribute to the event resulting in his injury, the defendant is not entitled
to relief from liability for that which he alone has caused. It would be patently
unfair to reduce the recovery of the plaintiff, whose injuries were sustained in
an accident for which he was in no way responsible. 68 The seat belt defense
would soon result in windfalls to tortfeasors who would pay only partially for
the harm their negligence caused. 69
3. Pre-Accident Conduct Does Not Require Mitigation
A third argument against the seat belt defense is that the duty to avoid the
consequences of another's negligence and to mitigate one's damages does not
arise until after the accident and injury have occurred. 7 0 Under the doctrine of
avoidable consequences, the injured plaintiff is required to exercise reasonable
care not to aggravate his injuries following the negligence of the defendant.
Plaintiff's pre-accident conduct was traditionally judged according to the doc-
trine of contributory negligence,7 1 which required him to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care for his own safety. Where plaintiff's actions did not contribute
to the cause of the accident, he was not contributorily negligent. Because the
use of seat belts does not contribute to the cause of the accident, plaintiff's non-
use cannot violate his duty to exercise ordinary care for his safety. To attempt
to use the doctrine of avoidable consequences on a pre-accident theory is to re-
quire the plaintiff to refrain from aggravating his injuries before they have ever
occurred. Plaintiff's pre-accident duty, however, is not to mitigate future in-
juries, but only to act so as not to cause the accident. For this reason, then, the
avoidable consequences doctrine is not applied to such pre-accident conduct as
failure to use a seat belt.
4. No Duty to Use a Seat Belt Exists
The question remains whether automobile occupants have a duty to wear
seat belts. Most courts have held that no duty to wear a seat belt exists.7 2 A
68 Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
69 Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1973); Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., No.
14810 (Sup. Ct. Mont. March 13, 1980); Carnation Co. v. Wong, 516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974); See also
Crowe v. Harrell, 122 Ga. App. 7, 176 S.E.2d 190 (1970) (Panell, J., concurring).
70 Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del
Super. Ct. 1967); McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 1976); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119,
167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99
N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719
(1975); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d
138 (1977); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
71 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 65, at 422-23 (4th ed. 1971).
72 Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1979); Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla.
App. 1966); Hampton v. State Highway Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972); Williams v. Harvey,
328 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1976); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969); Miller
v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 579, 544
P.2d 719 (1975); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48 (Okla. 1976); Carnation Co. v. Wong,
516 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. 1974); State Highway Dep't v. Hinson, 517 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974);
Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d. 1030 (1972); Contra, Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d
362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
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plaintiff is entitled to presume that the defendant will exercise ordinary care
and refrain from negligent conduct. 73 Courts have consequently been reluctant
to impose a common law duty to wear a seat belt, since such a duty would re-
quire the plaintiff to anticipate the defendant's negligence. This offends tradi-
tional notions of tort law.
Furthermore, no common law duty should arise if the plaintiff can justify
his failure to wear a seat belt. Industry and government may extol the benefits
of seat belts, but they cannot compel the general public to use these devices. In-
deed, in 1974, Congress repealed its controversial mandatory seat belt in-
terlock system legislation, and the automotive industry has yet to agree upon
the most effective safety system to employ in motor vehicles. 74 The general
public's failure to perceive the utility of seat belts justifies to some extent a
plaintiffs unwillingness to make use of the devices. Additionally, automobile
occupants may decline to wear seat belts due to fear of entrapment. 75 Though
statistics suggest that the likelihood of entrapment is slim, one need not look far
in the case reporters to identify numerous instances where it has occurred. 
7 6
In addressing the question of plaintiffs duty to wear seat belts, most
courts are quick to point out that no state has enacted a statute 77 requiring the
general public to use seat belts while driving. 78 These courts often suggest that
the legislature is the proper forum 79 for imposing such a duty upon the plain-
73 Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Nash v. Kamrath, 21 Ariz. App. 530, 521
P.2d 161 (1974); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio
App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53, rev'd on other grounds 29 Ohio St. 2d 99, 279 N.E.2d 878 (1971).
74 See discussion in Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., No. 14810 (Sup. Ct. Mont. March 13, 1980).
75 Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
76 See, e.g., Linhart v. Nelson, 58 Cal. App. 3d 630, 130 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1976) (decedent trapped by seat
belt in burning dune buggy); Churchill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 Ill. 2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978) (dece-
dent trapped in car by seat belt without opportunity to escape before collision with train).
In McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 1976), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed
the utility of seat belts and the hesitance of an individual to wear them. In McCord, the plaintiff passenger
sued both the host driver and the driver of a second car involved in an intersection collision. Rejecting the
availability the seat belt defense, the court stated:
In our view, this observation [regarding the utility of seat belts] lacks factual foundation,
particularly the statement that the seat belt "has never been shown to worsen an injury, but, on
the contrary, has prevented more serious ones." A moment's reflection shows that this assertion
cannot possibly be true. Numerous fatalities occur in automobile collisions when one car, forced
off a bridge or waterside highway, plunges into a river or is overturned and set ablaze. Obviously
the victims would have had a much greater chance of surviving had they not been trapped in the
submerged or burning car by buckled seat belts. There is no doubt, of course, that seat belts do
provide protection to belted occupants of cars in a head-on collision or cars braked to a screeching
halt, as the belt-wearer may be prevented from lurching forward against the steering wheel,
dashboard, or windshield.
These are not the only kinds of accidents which can happen to automobiles. Judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that a heavy majority of the appeals which reach this court are concerned
with litigation over intersectional collisions. In such cases the protective value of a seat belt is
dubious, for many an occupant pinned down by his belt beside a door bashed in by a broadside
impact, could suffer injuries which would not have occurred had he been thrown free. In the very
case we are considering, the host driver might have been badly hurt had he put on his seat belt
that night, for his testimony describes the side of his car as being crushed by the force of defen-
dant Green's vehicle. Consequently, even though intersectional collisions may occur with enough
frequency to be called a foreseeable incident of city driving, whether or not a seat belt will do
more harm than good to the victims of such an accident is unpredictable.
Id. at 723.
77 See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
78 See note 72 supra (citing c?,ses for support).
79 Five jurisdictions have legislatively prohibited the introduction of seat belt evidence in personal in-
jury actions. See note 9 supra.
[December 19801
[Vol. 56:272]
tiff.80 Thus, a plaintiff can persuasively argue that he has neither a statutory
nor a common law duty to wear a seat belt.
5. Management of the Defense and Other Technical Problems
Other arguments against the seat belt defense center around the courts'
ability to manage seat belt evidence and the manner in which the jury considers
it. An often stated reason for rejecting the defense is that a jury comparing
damages caused by the non-use of a seat belt with damages caused by the
defendant's negligence would necessarily speculate in apportioning liability. 81
A counterargument is that expert evidence can reduce the need to speculate
and that jurors must often make complex decisions involving the apportion-
ment of damages. 82
It is clear that the defendant must offer expert evidence to establish the
causal connection between non-use of a seat belt and aggravation of an
injury.8 3  Since the plaintiff would most likely attempt to counter the
defendant's experts by calling experts on his own behalf, the seat belt defense
creates another tort arena for a battle of safety and medical experts.8" The trial
court faces a balancing problem. It must permit sufficient expert testimony to
allow the defendant to make his case, yet prevent a battle of experts. In the
end, a court should consider the delay, confusion and difficulties arising from a
battle of experts in deciding whether to permit a defendant to introduce the seat
belt defense.
A second technical problem with the seat belt defense is that it is unclear
when a duty to wear seat belts arises. Ordinary prudence does not require all
automobile occupants to buckle up routinely. 5 Clearly, a pregnant woman
need not wear a seat belt and risk injury to her unborn child. 86 But what about
children, or the handicapped? It may not be possible to establish a duty to wear
seat belts without making arbitrary distinctions. As a result, the fairness of the
defense may become suspect, 87 and its utility diminished.
A final managerial problem with the seat belt defense concerns its expan-
sion. The courts are split as to whether the defense is available in strict prod-
80 See Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, 242 So.2d 666 (1970); Lipscomb v. Diamiani; 226 A.2d 914
(Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (Fla. App. 1966); Hampton v. State Highway
Comm'n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972); Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., No. 14810 (Sup. Ct.
Mont. March 13, 1980); Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53, reo'd on other grounds 29 Ohio
St. 2d 99, 279 N.E.2d 878 (1971).
81 Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, 242
So.2d 666 (1970); Fischer v. Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P.2d 458 (1975); Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d
914 (Del. Super. 1967); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970); Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99
N.J. Super. 270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
82 Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452-53, 323 N.E.2d 164, 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974).
83 See note 48 supra.
84 Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161,
492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
85 McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720 (D.C. 1976); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968).
86 Crosby and Costiloe, Safety of Lap-Belt Restraint for Pregnant Victims of Automobile Collisions, 284 NEw
ENOGANDJ. MED. 632 (March 25, 1971); Automobile Safety Belts During Pregnan, 221 J. A.M.A. 20 (July 3,
1972); for a listing of numerous medical references discussing seat belt injuries, see 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FAcTs 5§ 52-54 (1965 and Supp. 1980).
87 In another sense, the application of the seat belt defense is troublesome and unfair in that it only ap-
plies to plaintiffs injured in cars equipped with seat belts. Effectively, the plaintiff in the equipped vehicle is
penalized for his actions. See Britton v. Doehring, 287 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Derheim v. N.
Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
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ucts liability actions.88 Indeed, those courts which have accepted the defense
are unclear as to the manner in which such a defense may be used.8 9 If the
defense is available to mitigate damages in negligence actions, what justifies its
exclusion on the issue of damages in strict liability or even intentional tort ac-
tions? If the defense is to be expanded, it is necessary that its scope be defined
in a principled fashion.
In summary, the argument against the seat belt defense takes many
forms. Seat belt evidence might be excluded on the grounds that there is no du-
ty to wear seat belts, that non-use could not have caused the accident sued
upon, that defendants might otherwise enjoy a windfall, that the defense con-
flicts with traditional tort doctrines, or that management of the defense is ex-
cessively complex.
III. A Suggested Approach to the
Seat Belt Defense
Dean Prosser states that the seat belt defense presents one of the "more
difficult problems" in the law of torts, 90 because it operates to limit plaintiff's
recovery on the grounds that his prior conduct, while unrelated to the event
which caused the injury, played a material part in aggravating the ensuing
damages. An even greater difficulty arises, however, because the defense
allows a defendant to escape liability for his negligent and harmful conduct
merely because hindsight suggests that the plaintiff could have reduced his in-
juries by acting in advance of defendant's negligence. In light of the passive
nature of plaintiffs "negligence," it is difficult to justify denying him full com-
pensation for his injury.
In assessing the validity of the seat belt defense, factual circumstances in
which automobile accidents generally arise must be examined. It seems clear
that few automobile occupants anticipate that they will be involved in an acci-
dent. Indeed, the probability that an automobile driver or passenger will be in-
volved in an accident on any specific occasion is very low.9 1
Most people would admit that it is safer to use seat belts than to ignore
them. Statistics suggest, however, that most people do not feel that the utility of
wearing a seat belt is worth the inconvenience. 92 Because the plaintiff does not
believe that an accident will happen to him, he does not appreciate the added
measure of safety provided by the seat belt.
The question then, in light of the above observations, is whether or not it
is unreasonable for an individual to fail to use a seat belt. Although the injured
plaintiff does not enter the courtroom without some fault, it stretches the point
to describe his conduct as "unreasonable." Comparative negligence appor-
tions liability according to the respective faults of the parties. But plaintiffs
fault, by itself, does not result in any harm or injury until defendant's subse-
quent negligence places the plaintiff in the position of peril from which his in-
88 See note 6 supra.
89 Id.
90 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 423-24 (4th ed. 1971).
91 See discussion in 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Seat Belt Accidents § 5 (1965).
92 This is evidenced by the large sector of the public which does not wear seat belts. See note 40 supra.
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juries eventually arise. Though the plaintiff is not blameless, his culpability is
so slight that he should not be penalized for his failure to use a seat belt.
A survey of the numerous seat belt cases leaves the impression that many
courts are reluctant to allow a defendant substantially to escape liability for his
negligent conduct by virtue of the seat belt defense. 93 On the other hand, these
same courts seem unwilling to absolve the plaintiff of his respective blame for
failing to use the seat belt. Many courts might permit the jury to mitigate plain-
tiffs damages were it not for the substantial windfall available to the defen-
dant.
The real problem before a court considering the seat belt defense arises
from the comparison of the plaintiff's passive conduct, characterized by his
"omission" of seat belt use, with the defendant's active conduct, characterized
by his "commission" of a tortious act. Comparing these dissimilar types of
conduct is extraordinarily difficult, and must be performed cautiously. 94
The Restatement (Second) of Torts sheds some light on these types of con-
duct and on how the question of seat belt evidence might be settled. A
plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt is a force contributing to the injury which the
plaintiff receives. The defendant's subsequent negligence is an intervening
force which creates the event from which plaintiff's injuries arise. The question
is whether defendant's negligence supersedes the plaintiffs. Sections 44095 and
44196 of the Restatement define superseding and intervening forces, respective-
ly. Comment b to section 441 addresses the nature of conduct exemplified in
the seat belt situation:
The cases in which the effect of the operation of an intervening force may
be important in determining whether the negligent actor [the plaintiff] is liable
for [his own] harm are usually, although not exclusively, cases in which the ac-
tor's negligence has created a situation harmless unless something further oc-
curs, but capable of being made dangerous by the operation of some new force
and in which the intervening force makes a potentially dangerous situation in-
jurious. In such cases the actor's negligence is often called passive negligence,
while the [other] person's negligence, which sets the intervening force in active
operation, is called active negligence. 97
93 Clark v. State, 28 Conn. Supp. 398, 264 A.2d 366 (1970); Remington v. Arndt., 28 Conn. Supp.
289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969); Kavanaugh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966); Cierpisz v.
Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968);
Bertsch v. Spears, 20 Ohio App. 2d 137, 252 N.E.2d 194 (1969), Parise v. Fehnel,__ Pa. Super. -,
406 A.2d 345 (1979).
94 For a contrasting discussion of passive negligence in the seat belt situation, see Miller, The Seat Belt
Defense Under Comparative Negligence, 12 IDAHO L. REv. 59, 63-65, 66-68 (1975).
In Hernke v. Coronet Ins. Co., 72 Wis.2d 170, 240 N.W.2d 382 (1972), the court specifically labeled
plaintiff's non-use as passive negligence and found that the seat belt defense was available to mitigate
damages.
95 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 5 440 (1965) defines a superseding cause as "an act of a third per-
son or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which
his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."
96 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965) defines an intervening force as follows:
(1) An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another after the ac-
tor's negligent act or omission has been committed.
(2) Whether the active operation of an intervening force prevents the actor's antecedent
negligence from being a legal cause in bringing about harm to another is determined by the rules
stated in §§ 442-453.
97 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 5 441, comment b (1965). Sections 440 and 441 are not totally
analogous to the seat belt situation for these sections contemplate two negligent parties or forces acting to in-
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Section 44298 lists those considerations which suggest the point in time when an
intervening force becomes a superseding cause of the harm. Applying these
considerations in the most common case, the defendant-driver's active
negligence in causing the accident and plaintiffs injury would be an interven-
ing and superseding cause of the harm incurred. 99 The injury to the plaintiff
would not normally occur absent the defendant's negligence. 100 The plaintiffs
conduct is excusable except in hindsight which suggests that he should have
acted differently.' 0' The defendant's conduct is far more culpable than the
plaintiff's.' 0° Thus, in accordance with the Restatement, the defendant's
negligence is a superseding and intervening cause of the plaintiffs injury, and
evidence of non-use of a seat belt is inadmissible.
However, as several courts have stated, certain situations may arise where
a plaintiffs passive negligence rises to such a level that exclusion of evidence
concerning that negligence cannot be justified.10 3 Peculiar circumstances ap-
parent to the plaintiff may cast a different light on the reasonableness of his
conduct. Thus, in the case of a passenger suing the host-driver, if the defendant
had warned the plaintiff that his car had poor tires and steering, the plaintiff's
failure to wear a seat belt would be a factor for jury consideration.10 4 In such a
case, plaintiffs negligence arguably rises to a level of virtually "assuming the
risk": 0 5 the passive act of failing to buckle up is transformed into the affir-
jure a third party. In the seat belt situation, one of the negligent parties is also the injured party, thus con-
tributory negligence principles would normally be applicable. It is not argued that these rules strictly apply
to the present situation. However, they are analogous. With the increasing popularity of comparative
negligence, courts must examine the respective faults of the litigants. These Restatement (Second) rules sug-
gest an approach to determine when a person's actions are sufficient to make him liable for an injury,
despite the actions of other parties which may have remotely contributed to the harm incurred. Thus, these
principles provide at least a starting point for the analysis of the seat belt defense.
98 Those considerations important in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause
of the injury are listed in 5 442 which provides:
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an intervening force is a
superseding cause of harm to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which would
otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be ex-
traordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created by
the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or to his
failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is wrongful
toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him;
() the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening
force in motion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1955).
99 Sections 440 and 441 contemplate that the negligent actor (the plaintiff) has acted in such a way that
he has "lost control of the situation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 441, comment a (1965). An in-
tervening force must be so unexpected and so negligent that it supersedes the first actor's conduct which ad-
mittedly created a "potentially dangerous situation." In the seat belt situation, the plaintiffs passive
negligence does not rise to the level of "lost control" contemplated by the restatement. It is submitted,
therefore, for purposes of this analogy that with the respective decline in plaintiff's standard of conduct, the
burden of showing an intervening and superseding force created by defendant's conduct would likewise
decline.
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 442(a) and (c) (1965).
101 See id. § 442(b).
102 See id. § 442(f).
103 See note 93 supra.
104 Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969).
105 See note 94 supra.
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mative act of refusing to buckle up.10 6 Applying the considerations listed in sec-
tion 442, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the plaintiff's conduct is no longer
unjustifiable only in hindsight. Particular circumstances made the harm in-
curred foreseeable and plaintiff assumed the risk. The defendant's actions,
though intervening, are no longer superseding. Both parties are jointly respon-
sible for the harm that has befallen plaintiff; their respective faults are no
longer grossly unequal. Under these circumstances, the seat belt defense
should be available to the defendant to mitigate damages.
Conclusion
Under the theory set forth in the last section of this note, evidence of a
plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt is admissible only when peculiar cir-
cumstances apparent to the plaintiff indicate that a seat belt should be used to
protect the plaintiff from foreseeable harm. Ordinarily, a defendant-driver's
negligence should be presumed to be a superseding cause of plaintiff's injuries,
and seat belt evidence should be inadmissible. However, if the defendant can
satisfy the court that unusual and extenuating circumstances existed which
placed the plaintiff on notice of danger and effectively raised his "passive" con-
duct to the level of assuming the risk, then evidence of plaintiff's non-use
should be admissible for the jury to consider in mitigating damages.
The "exceptional circumstances" approach represents a compromise be-
tween the two prevailing rules which either totally exclude seat belt evidence or
allow the seat belt defense, with proper foundation, in all circumstances. This
compromise approach does not create an absolute duty to wear a seat belt. It
eliminates the "windfall" defense absent a showing of exceptional cir-
cumstances. This approach appears most equitable and has in fact been
106 The Montana Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of the seat belt defense in a case with facts
ideally suited for the application of the "exceptional circumstances" theory. In Kopischke v. First Con-
tinental Corporation, No. 14810 (Sup. Ct. Mont. March 13, 1980), the plaintiff, Mrs. Kopischke, brought
suit against the defendant used car dealer for its failure to inspect and repair defects in one of its
used cars. The plaintiff argued that such defects were discoverable in the exercise of ordinary care. Mrs.
Kopischke was injured when the right front stabilizer in the car which she had purchased from the defendant
disconnected. When the car veered out of control across the road and rolled over, the plaintiff was severely
injured.
Mrs. Kopischke knew beforehand that her car had numerous defects. She had noticed prior to purchas-
ing the car that it had a tendency to veer to the left. Her mechanic had examined it and warned her that it
was not "safe to drive." Furthermore, she had been cautioned against driving it by her husband. Never-
theless, she continued to drive the car against the advice of her husband and mechanic. The defendant,
among other things, argued that plaintiff's non-use of a seat belt was to be considered by the jury for pur-
poses of mitigating any damages they might award. The majority, after an extensive discussion of conflict-
ing case precedent from other jurisdictions, held that in the absence of direction from the state legislature,
the better rule was to deny the introduction of the seat belt defense.
Justice Harrison, however, dissented from the court's opinion on the seat belt defense. In many
respects, his opinion called for at least the application of the "exceptional circumstances" theory, if not a
broader theory. In the words of Justice Harrison:
If ever there was a case presented to this Court indicating the necessity of using seat belts,
this is the case. The very fact that respondent and her husband, from the very time of purchase,
had difficulties with the car and sought the advice of a friend who was a mechanic, indicates that
respondent knew the car's condition and should have worn seat belts during any drive that she
took in the car.
Under these circumstances, and considering the accident where she drove off the road and
was thrown out of the car, there is no question that her failure to "belt up" contributed to the
seriousness of her injuries.
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recognized by several courts. 10 7 Other courts would do well to adopt the "ex-
ceptional circumstances" approach. If they do, the question of the seat belt
defense may well be settled once and for all.
David F. Guldenschuh
. . . The very condition of the car itself warranted the conclusion that respondent's injuries
would have been minimal had she worn the seat belt and thus remained inside the car.
The Court, obviously, holds as a matter of law that under no circumstances could the
defense of the failure to wear a seat belt be considered, in my opinion, that is error.
S.. I think that because the alleged negligence of appellant had been discovered before the
accident a jury question exists on the use of seat belts.
Indeed, Kopischke represents the type of case where the plaintiff's actions rise to such a level that they
can no longer be considered as "passive" negligence. Consideration of seat belt evidence is permissible
here.
107 See notes 26-33 and 93 supra and accompanying text.
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